" title="Peter H. Bickford Legal & Dispute Resolution Services"> Peter H. Bickford Legal & Dispute Resolution Services

The lead article in today’s New York Law Journal reports that because of “newly discovered assets” of an insurance company that has been in liquidation since 1997, $18 million has been added to the strapped Public Motor Vehicle Security Fund (PMV Fund), which will allow the PMV Fund to pay approved claims that have been unpaid for many years because of a lack of funds, and to allow the Bureau to address the backlog of unprocessed claims.

The company is New York Merchant Bakers Insurance Company (“Merchant Bakers”). According to public records and other data obtained from the Insurance Department under the Freedom of Information Law, Merchant Bakers has not just been the largest drain on the PMV Fund; it has been the monster drain. For the five years from 2002 through 2006, the PMV Fund paid out over $131 million in claims, of which almost $95 million were paid to claimants of Merchant Bakers – more than 72% of the total. In fact, Merchant Bakers and one other company, Capital Mutual Insurance Company, which has been in liquidation since 2000, account for over 90% of the total payments from the PMV Fund.

I applaud the Liquidation Bureau for addressing long overdue claims against the PMV Fund. However, the impact of Merchant Bakers on the financially challenged PMV Fund over past decade underscores the need to separate the security fund function from the Liquidation Bureau. New York is the only state where the insurance security or guaranty funds are not separate entities from the receiver – usually with their own boards of directors or trustees including industry representation (after all, it is their money in these funds). In New York, however, the funds are basically bank accounts with the receiver as the authorized signatory (for a discussion of the liquidation process in the US, including the operation of guaranty funds see my article “Who Protects Us from the Receiver?” at www.pbnylaw.com/publications).

Perhaps if the PMV Fund had been a separate entity, it would have questioned the overly concentrated drain on the Fund by one or two companies, which could have led to solutions to the PMV Fund crisis. Perhaps, too, pressure from a separate entity could have helped the Liquidation Bureau “find” the $18 million in assets a lot sooner. The law Journal article does not explain where or how the $18 million was “newly discovered.” That could well be the real story here!

The New York Court of Appeals unanimously decided yesterday that in his capacity as liquidator of insurance companies the superintendent of insurance is not a state officer, and that the New York Liquidation Bureau acting as the liquidator’s agent is not a state agency. Furthermore, the Court determined that the assets of the estates under the control of the liquidator are private not state funds, nor are these assets funds held by a state officer or agency. Therefore, the State Comptroller has no authority to audit the Bureau or subpoena its personnel. A copy of the decision can be obtained from the Liquidation Bureau’s website at http://www.nylb.org/ or by sending a request to me at pbickford@pbnylaw.com.

Although the case seems to put to bed the Comptroller’s ability to force an audit of the Liquidation Bureau, there is an interesting footnote in the decision that reads as follows:

“This holding is not meant to imply that the Superintendent may not be subject to an independent audit. Although the Legislature does not have the authority under our holding in Blue Cross and Blue Shield to assign to the Comptroller the task of auditing the Bureau, it does have the authority to require the Bureau to retain independent auditors.”

This footnote seems to leave the door open for the Legislature to provide for forced, independent audits of the Liquidation Bureau, a move the Superintendent may have anticipated in the Liquidation Bureau’s press release on the decision where the Superintendent states:

“Although this case was about far more than transparency and outside oversight, transparency and accountability are nonetheless critical elements in successfully fulfilling the Bureau’s legal responsibilities.”

The Superintendent then goes on to talk about all the actions, including a “top to bottom” audit of the Bureau and each of the estates under its control. I will be commenting more fully on these “transparency” and “audit” issue in future postings. For my earlier comments on this case, made following the Appellate Division ruling, see my entry for March 22, 2007.

When New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer (now Governor Spitzer) went after the major insurance brokerage firms for bid rigging a few years ago, he also attacked contingent commissions as part of the scheme to direct business, characterizing these payments as equivalent to kickbacks. In the subsequent settlements with the major brokers, the brokers agreed to forego contingent commissions in the future, casting a pall over the practice by the entire brokerage community, not just the majors.

Now a recent Appellate Division case, Hersch v. DeWitt Stern Group, Inc. (2007 NY Slip Op 06567, App. Div. 1^st Dept., Sept. 6, 2007), has focused attention again on the propriety of contingent commissions. In the Hersch case, plaintiff had sued his broker for failing to obtain certain coverages, and several of the causes of action were based on breach of fiduciary duty for, inter alia, failing to disclose the existence of a contingent commission agreement. The Court found that the fiduciary duty causes of action should have been dismissed because contingent commissions are not illegal and, absent a special relationship, defendant had no duty to disclose the existence of the contingent commission agreement.

The Court based its finding that contingent commissions are not illegal on a 1985 Court of Appeals decision, Amusement Bus. Underwriters v. American Intl. Group (66 NY2d 878). The Court of Appeals in Amusement Bus. Underwriters, however, did not specifically hold that contingent commissions were legal. It was interpreting the terms of a contingent commission agreement, and the issue of the legality of the agreement does not appear to have been before the Court.

The Hersch Court’s finding that the broker had no duty to disclose the contingent commission agreement, also seems to fly in the face of a regulatory requirement for disclosure. Circular Letter 22 issued by the New York Insurance Department in 1998 imposes a regulatory requirement that all special or extra compensation arrangements between carriers and a broker must be disclosed to customers. The Hersch Court makes no mention of this requirement.

Given the significance of the issues it roils, the Hersch decision is remarkably short (three paragraphs). We will have to wait and see if the decision is appealed, but until the Court of Appeals rules otherwise, it appears that contingent commissions can once again be discussed openly in polite circles – at least in New York’s First Department.